Showing posts with label Trial Lawyers Using Real Science; Behavioral Realism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trial Lawyers Using Real Science; Behavioral Realism. Show all posts

Monday, January 9, 2012

A Nice Article On Cognitive Capacity


Neural substrates of cognitive capacity limitations
Timothy J. Buschmana,1, Markus Siegela,b, Jefferson E. Roya, and Earl K. Millera
aThe Picower Institute for Learning and Memory and Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA 02139; and bCentre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen, 72076 Tübingen, Germany
Edited by Robert Desimone, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, and approved May 23, 2011 (received for review March 23, 2011)

Cognition has a severely limited capacity: Adult humans can retain only about four items “in mind”. This limitation is fundamental to human brain function: Individual capacity is highly correlated with intelligence measures and capacity is reduced in neuropsychiatric diseases. Although human capacity limitations are well studied, their mechanisms have not been investigated at the single-neuron level. Simultaneous recordings from monkey parietal and frontal cortex revealed that visual capacity limitations occurred immedi- ately upon stimulus encoding and in a bottom-up manner. Capacity limitations were found to reflect a dual model of working memory. The left and right halves of visual space had independent capacities and thus are discrete resources. However, within each hemifield, neural information about successfully remembered objects was re- duced by adding further objects, indicating that resources are shared. Together, these results suggest visual capacity limitation is due to discrete, slot-like, resources, each containing limited pools of neural information that can be divided among objects. 
Go to the full article

Wednesday, November 16, 2011

Using framing to your advantage

It's Not All About Me: Motivating Hand Hygiene Among Health Care Professionals by Focusing on Patients

Psychologists Adam M. Grant and David A. Hofmann recently did experiments in a hospital to understand the effectiveness of signs that promote hand hygiene.

In the field experiments, there were interesting findings when it came down to the comparisons of different hand hygiene signs located near dispensaries, which either promoted the idea of “hand hygiene prevents you from catching diseases,” or “hand hygiene prevents patients from catching diseases.”

At the Vienna General Hospital in 1847, Ignaz Semmelweis required health care officials to wash their hands, and the affects were dramatic. Death rates due to childbed fever decreased from 18.3% to 1.3%. After extensive research, it has since been found that hand hygiene plays an extremely important role in preventing the spread of diseases and infections.

In the study performed by Adam and Hofmann, the percentage of soap and hand-sanitizing gel were measured during 2-week periods before and after the signs were introduced.

Here are the results:

Personal consequence: 35% pre-experiment, 33% post-experiment

Patient consequences: 37% pre-experiment, 54% post-experiment

It was discovered that when it came to someone else’s life at stake when dealing with the potential spread of diseases, health care officials had better hand hygiene. But when it came to being reminded that washing hands prevents themselves from catching diseases, they didn’t seem to think twice about it.

Thinking about the patient is crucially important, and in the long run can help both health care officials and patients stay away from infectious diseases.

Cite: Psychological Science


If you have an interest in learning how you can use psychological science to your advantage in your case, please contact David A. Wenner, 602.224.0005 or david@jurybias.com

Monday, November 14, 2011

A VERY INTERESTING ARTICLE, INDEED, ON JUROR BIAS

Neurolaw: Differential brain activity for Black and White faces predicts damage awards in hypothetical employment discrimination cases

Abstract

Currently, potential jurors' racial biases are measured by explicit questioning––a poor measure because people often hide their views to adhere to social norms, and people have implicit views they are not consciously aware of. In this experiment, we investigated whether two alternative methods of measuring racial bias––a standard Black/White, good/bad Implicit Association Test (IAT) and neural activity, measured by fMRI, in response to seeing faces of Black and White individuals––could predict how much money subjects would award Black victims in hypothetical employment discrimination cases. IAT scores failed to predict how much money subjects awarded victims. However, in right inferior parietal lobule (BA 40) and in right superior/middle frontal gyrus (BA 9/10)––which have both previously been implicated in measuring biases and implicit preferences––the difference in neural activity between when subjects viewed Black faces paired with neutral adjectives and when subjects viewed White faces paired with neutral adjectives was positively correlated with the amount of money the subjects awarded victims. This suggests that brain activity measures racial bias with more practical validity, at least in this situation and with our sample size, than a common behavioral measure (the IAT).

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17470919.2011.631739

Sunday, October 30, 2011

Juror Bias

12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias





Harvard Journal of Racial & Ethnic Justice, Vol. 27, p. 165, 2011

Abstract:
Federal Evidence Rule 606(b) and similar state rules prohibit post-verdict admission of juror statements, including racist or biased remarks, made during deliberations. The roots of the evidentiary prohibition are historically deep and the interests underlying the Rule implicate the very existence of the jury system. Constitutionality of the post-verdict evidentiary exclusion is based upon the presumption that pre-trial and trial mechanisms exist to discern juror bias prior to deliberations. Empirical studies and recent cases indicate, however, that these mechanisms do not currently operate to adequately expose or remove juror biases. This article argues that the expansion of these mechanisms, including more diverse jury venires, more robust and effective juror voir dire, less discretion for parties to remove jurors on the basis of race, and the development of jury admonitions directly addressing bias, will reduce juror expressions of bias during deliberations. Even with these reforms, however, not all juror bias will be disclosed and, whether for reasons of embarrassment, inattention or intent, some jurors will misrepresent material biases during voir dire. To address juror misrepresentations during voir dire, the article proposes a narrow exception to Rule 606(b) permitting inquiry into juror bias for the purpose of showing juror misrepresentation. The article’s unique approach of combining enhanced pre-trial and trial mechanisms with a narrow exception to the rule to address juror misrepresentations strikes a balance between upholding the goals underlying Rule 606(b) and the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

Thursday, August 11, 2011

Using psychological science in the courtroom

Effective Reaction to Danger: Attachment

Insecurities Predict Behavioral Reactions

to an Experimentally Induced Threat Above

and Beyond General Personality Traits


Tsachi Ein-Dor1, Mario Mikulincer1, and Phillip R. Shaver2


Abstract

People who score high on attachment anxiety or avoidance display poorer adjustment than secure individuals in various social, emotional, and behavioral domains. Yet it may be advantageous for groups to include insecure as well as secure members. The authors tested predictions from social defense theory concerning advantages to groups of including members with different attachment patterns. A total of 46 groups were unobtrusively observed in a threatening laboratory situation: The room gradually filled with smoke, apparently because of a malfunctioning computer. Attachment anxiety was associated with quicker detection of the danger and therefore with greater group effectiveness. Attachment-related avoidance was associated with speedier escape responses to the danger once it was detected and therefore with greater group safety. The results remained significant even when extraversion and neuroticism, two possible confounds, were statistically controlled. Implications of the findings for theory and research concerning group processes, threat detection, and individual differences in attachment are discussed.


http://spp.sagepub.com/content/2/5/467.abstract

Thursday, July 14, 2011

A Specific and Rapid Neural Signature for Parental Instinct

Morten L. Kringelbach1,2,8,9*, Annukka Lehtonen1, Sarah Squire1, Allison G. Harvey3, Michelle G. Craske4, Ian E. Holliday5, Alexander L. Green8, Tipu Z. Aziz2,8, Peter C. Hansen6, Piers L. Cornelissen7, Alan Stein1

1 Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, 2Department of Physiology, Anatomy and Genetics, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom, 3 Department of Psychology, University of California, Berkeley, California, United States of America, 4 Department of Psychology, University of California Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, United States of America, 5 The Wellcome Trust Laboratory for MEG Studies, School of Life and Health Sciences, Aston University, Birmingham, United Kingdom, 6 School of Psychology, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, United Kingdom, 7 Department of Psychology, York University, York, United Kingdom, 8 Department of Neurosurgery, John Radcliffe Hospital, Oxford, United Kingdom, 9 Center of Functionally Integrative Neuroscience (CFIN), Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark

Abstract

Darwin originally pointed out that there is something about infants which prompts adults to respond to and care for them, in order to increase individual fitness, i.e. reproductive success, via increased survivorship of one's own offspring. Lorenz proposed that it is the specific structure of the infant face that serves to elicit these parental responses, but the biological basis for this remains elusive. Here, we investigated whether adults show specific brain responses to unfamiliar infant faces compared to adult faces, where the infant and adult faces had been carefully matched across the two groups for emotional valence and arousal, as well as size and luminosity. The faces also matched closely in terms of attractiveness. Using magnetoencephalography (MEG) in adults, we found that highly specific brain activity occurred within a seventh of a second in response to unfamiliar infant faces but not to adult faces. This activity occurred in the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC), an area implicated in reward behaviour, suggesting for the first time a neural basis for this vital evolutionary process. We found a peak in activity first in mOFC and then in the right fusiform face area (FFA). In mOFC the first significant peak (p<0.001) in differences in power between infant and adult faces was found at around 130 ms in the 10–15 Hz band. These early differences were not found in the FFA. In contrast, differences in power were found later, at around 165 ms, in a different band (20–25 Hz) in the right FFA, suggesting a feedback effect from mOFC. These findings provide evidence in humans of a potential brain basis for the “innate releasing mechanisms” described by Lorenz for affection and nurturing of young infants. This has potentially important clinical applications in relation to postnatal depression, and could provide opportunities for early identification of families at risk.

http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0001664

This research provides scientific evidence confirming what advertisers have known for decades that baby images elicit positive emotional responses of empathy and protection. This is useful research for trial lawyers who are in the business of creating empathy and the need for protection.The article can be accessed from the link herein. David A. Wenner


Saturday, May 14, 2011

An interesting article definitely worth reading.

Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory


Hugo Mercier
University of Pennsylvania

Dan Sperber
affiliation not provided to SSRN



Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 57-74, 2011

Abstract:
Reasoning is generally seen as a means to improve knowledge and make better decisions. However, much evidence shows that reasoning often leads to epistemic distortions and poor decisions. This suggests that the function of reasoning should be rethought. Our hypothesis is that the function of reasoning is argumentative. It is to devise and evaluate arguments intended to persuade. Reasoning so conceived is adaptive given the exceptional dependence of humans on communication and their vulnerability to misinformation. A wide range of evidence in the psychology of reasoning and decision making can be reinterpreted and better explained in the light of this hypothesis. Poor performance in standard reasoning tasks is explained by the lack of argumentative context. When the same problems are placed in a proper argumentative setting, people turn out to be skilled arguers. Skilled arguers, however, are not after the truth but after arguments supporting their views. This explains the notorious confirmation bias. This bias is apparent not only when people are actually arguing but also when they are reasoning proactively from the perspective of having to defend their opinions. Reasoning so motivated can distort evaluations and attitudes and allow erroneous beliefs to persist. Proactively used reasoning also favors decisions that are easy to justify but not necessarily better. In all these instances traditionally described as failures or flaws, reasoning does exactly what can be expected of an argumentative device: Look for arguments that support a given conclusion, and, ceteris paribus, favor conclusions for which arguments can be found.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1698090

Saturday, April 23, 2011

Are jurors influenced by what they wish to believe?

The preeminent social psychologist, Lee Ross, and his colleagues conducted an interesting experiment, recently published in Psychological Science[1], demonstrating that the evaluation of scientific evidence is shaped more by what a person desires to be true than what they initially believed to be true.

The study recruited subjects who believed that child home care was superior to day care. Half of the subject were conflicted about the issue and indicated that they intended to use day care for their children. The subjects were motivated to believe that day care was as good as home care. The un-conflicted group indicated that they intended to use only home care.

The subjects were given two fictional studies. Half the subjects were led to believe study 1 favored day care and study 2 home care; the other half of the subjects were led to believe the opposite for studies 1 and 2. After reading the studies, the subjects evaluated which of the two studies provided more valid conclusions, listed the strengths and weaknesses and evaluated the persuasiveness of each study. The subjects’ last task was to evaluate which form of childcare would have a better effect on child development.

The results of the study dramatically showed subjects were more persuaded by scientific evidence that confirmed what they wished to be true than what they initially believed to be true. Subjects who initially indicated that they intended to send their children to day care, even though they believed home care to be superior, were unconsciously motivated to favor scientific evidence that was consistent with their desire to believe day care would not adversely affect their children. When these subjects were exposed to two studies reaching opposite conclusions, they shifted their belief from their initial position and concluded that home care was no better than day care.

The un-conflicted subjects, those who intended to use home care, maintained their strong initial belief that home care was superior. The un-conflicted subject did not alter their initial belief even though they were exposed to a scientific study that was inconsistent with their belief and instead favored the study that confirmed their belief.

The Ross study is important for trial lawyers, and corroborates the Jury Bias Model, that despite the evidence, jurors search for evidence during trial that favors their beliefs and, perhaps, what they need to believe. Jurors typically face conflicting evidence at trial. Jurors likely will favor that evidence that confirms beliefs and what they wish to believe even in the face of scientific evidence to the contrary. The quality and persuasiveness of the scientific evidence is filtered through the jurors’ wishful thinking rather than an objective evaluation of the merits of the science. Knowing what jurors need to believe is essential.

The implicit assumption of the civil justice system is that jurors objectively weigh the evidence, are free from bias, and that the best science applied to the facts determines who wins and loses. This assumption is contrary to decision-making science.

We are, after all, naive realist and believe that we perceive things as they really are. See, Ross, L., & Ward, A. (1996). Naive realism in everyday life: Implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In T. Brown, E. S. Reed, & E. Turiel (Eds.), Values and knowledge. The Jean Piaget Symposium Series (pp. 103–135). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Naively, we expect other reasonable people to see things as we do if exposed to the same information. Trial lawyers may believe, all too willingly, that jurors will perceive the evidence in the same way they do; after all, trial lawyers fall prey to the same naïve realism that all people do and believe they perceive the evidence as it really is. Trial lawyers are not immune for this bias blind spot simply because of their professional training. People do not readily recognize their own biases. Trial lawyers are no exception.

Often in evaluating their cases trial lawyers fail to recognize how their biases affect their judgment and juror bias affects juror judgment. Trial lawyers must become behavioral realists and litigate their cases understanding how jurors actually evaluate evidence rather than how they wish jurors would evaluate the evidence. The implication is that we must build our case from the bottom-up, starting with what the jurors must believe for plaintiff to win, rather than from the top-down, what trial lawyers and their experts believe the evidence really shows! Once we know what jurors must believe, then, and only then, can we know how to build the case consistent with juror beliefs and wishes. Jurors should not be required to change how they perceive the world as a prerequisite to winning.

Not only do trial lawyers contend with beliefs and wishes that have developed through the jurors unique life experience, now they must contend with anti-plaintiff beliefs that have resulted from politically motivated campaigns to instill an anti-plaintiff bias. In litigation, the trial lawyers must identify the most common case specific event schemas and anti-plaintiff bias schemas. Both tasks are essential to success in civil litigation in today’s environment. Ignoring what we now know about human behavior and how jurors process information is simply inexcusable.

In a dram shop case, for instance, what particular event schemas are important? What safety precautions do people believe a bar should institute to prevent a customer from becoming intoxicated and killing or maiming someone as a consequence? People have unconscious maps about how a bar operates and what is a reasonable to protect the public. It matters little what the experts and research shows if it is incongruent with event schema driven beliefs. Once the juror beliefs are identified then the task of discovering the science that confirms those event schemas or unconscious maps can begin. Jurors will resist evidence inconsistent with their unconscious maps, as the Ross study demonstrates.

One common event schema operating in this dram shop cases, is that the person who drinks is in the best position to protect against the harm resulting from his drinking. Jurors reflexively find it unfair to ask a business to protect someone from himself. Another common event schema that often arises in this context, is that people who know alcoholics or heavy drinkers have unconscious maps about how these people behave.[2] One legal issue in these cases is proving the level of intoxication at the time wreck was the result of the alcohol ingested at the bar. The time between the drunk leaving the bar and the wreck is critical to decision making. People with experience with alcoholics have maps about how these people behave such as "oh he probably stopped somewhere after leaving the bar and bought six pack" or "these people always keep liquor in the car and he must have been drinking in his car after left the bar”. Such maps serve to excuse the conduct of the bar. If you identify these unconscious maps then demonstrating there was no time to stop for liquor and that the police did not find liquor in the car at the time of the wreck is easily addressed during discovery. Seemingly minor issues like these, left unaddressed at trial, can have devastating consequences. Knowing the unconscious maps at work and who your jurors are can prevent a misstep like this.

Another goal is to discover the impact of the anti-plaintiff bias. Do the facts elicit suspicion about the plaintiff? Did the plaintiff act like the tort reformer's prototypical plaintiff that was the exemplar for the anti-plaintiff bias? Do people feel victimized by specific lawsuits like these? In other words, is the public more concerned about lawsuits personal impact than in a just result? Have you presented a case so complex, that people find it is easier to conclude that stuff happens rather than struggle to understand the facts? Finally, do people believe that if the plaintiff had been personally responsible, the harm would have been avoided? People disfavor protecting people from themselves. If the plaintiff had the ability to prevent the injury he better have a great explanation why failed to do so.

Building the case from the bottom up means discovering at the earliest opportunity what unconscious maps people use to evaluate the conduct of the defendant and the plaintiff.

People believe and need to believe they live in a safe world. People need to believe, for instance, that their hospitals are safe. If we frame the case to prove hospitals are unsafe the plaintiff will encounter the same result Ross and his colleagues found in their research. Jurors will perceive the science and expert testimony to be congruent with their wish to believe their hospitals are safe.

Telling jurors that 98,000 people die every year in hospitals from preventable errors or that hospital negligence is the 4th leading cause of death will not persuade jurors that malpractice is a common occurrence or that it is more likely that plaintiff was one of the 98,000. Jurors, like everyone else, are loss averse. People do not want to lose what they already have. People feel safe and need to believe they are safe. Instilling fear in jurors is not the answer, as some might suggest. The answer is to accept that we all need to feel safe and protected, as Mandell[3] and others suggest, and to utilize that belief in framing the case. For full discussion of framing the safety issue at trial I invite you to attend the Jury Bias Litigation Group Trial Advocacy Tract at the AAJ convention in New York this summer.



[1] Wishful Thinking: Belief, Desire, and the Motivated Evaluation of Scientific Evidence

Anthony Bastardi, Eric Luis Uhlmann, and Lee Ross, Psychological Science, April 2011; first published on April 22, 2011

[2] For this reason it is risky to allow jurors with personally relevant experience to sit. One cannot know what event schemas these people unconsciously hold. If you bet wrong these jurors can infect the other jurors with their personal event schemas and the trial lawyer cannot possibly predict the effect on deliberation. When in doubt, kick them out!

[3] See, Trial 2000 "OVERCOMING JUROR BIAS: IS THERE AN ANSWER?" posted April 14, 2011 in this blog

Thursday, April 21, 2011

Personal Responsibility Bias

An Attributional Analysis of Reactions to Poverty: The Political Ideology of the Giver and the Perceived Morality of the Receiver


Bernard Weiner1, Danny Osborne1, and Udo Rudolph2 Abstract


Personality and Social Psychology Review 15(2) 199–213 © 2011 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.

Reprints and permission: sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/1088868310387615 http://pspr.sagepub.com


An attributional analysis of reactions to poverty is presented. The article begins by discussing the perceived causes of poverty and their taxonomic properties (locus, stability, and controllability). One antecedent of causal beliefs, political ideology, is then examined in detail, followed by a review of the effects of causal beliefs on emotions and behavior. It is contended that helping the poor is a moral issue, but the moral evaluation concerns the targeted recipient of aid rather than the potential help giver. Persons perceived as responsible for their plight, a dominant construal for conservatives, elicit anger and neglect. In contrast, those seen as not responsible for their financial hardship, an outlook predominantly endorsed by liberals, arouse sympathy and help giving. Sympathy is the most important proximal determinant of aid. This analysis is extended to reactions to achievement failure, abortion, and rape. Policy implications are also examined.

Here is the link to the article:

http://psr.sagepub.com/content/15/2/199.abstract


The implications of this research for trial lawyers are obvious. The personal responsibility bias has enormous impact on how a person's plight is perceived. A person who is perceived as having had control of the cause of the harm s more likely to be judged as morally culpable for his predicament. Thus, causal control and personal responsibility are intimately related. If plaintiff had causal control over the injury then jurors will judge the plaintiff as personally responsible. That is why it is critical to demonstrate the precautions the plaintiff took to avoid being harmed. People who are perceived as responsible for their harm are less likely to receive help. Jurors will be less motivated to help a plaintiff who had the ability to have protected against the injury.


Another big point of this research is that political ideology influences perception. Conservatives are more likely to attribute harm to personally controllable causes. Progressives are more inclined to attribute harm to the situation in which the harm was caused. Moreover, the research suggests that conservatives are willing to help less than progressives. Something that may be worth considering in jury selection.



Sunday, April 10, 2011

Priming Jurors with American Symbols

Have you ever thought that wearing an American flag lapel pin during trial will positively influence the jury? Have you assumed that invoking the Constitution or symbols people associate with America will unconsciously influence jurors to be more receptive the plaintiff’s narrative. Research, to be published soon, suggests that priming people with symbols of America leads to a shift toward Republican beliefs and values. This was true even in those who consciously expressed more progressive beliefs. So the prime affects liberals and conservatives are equally. It seems implicitly, or explicitly, exposing people to American symbols increases the likelihood of creating people who express politically conservative attitudes.

Thus, priming jurors with American symbols may unconsciously push them to be more conservative. We know that conservatives are more likely to favor tort reform. And, our research shows that jurors who favor tort reform are more likely to apply the descriptive biases of the Jury Bias Model. Using American symbols in trial may well push jurors to act and think more conservatively. You may, thus, unintentionally, influence the liberal jurors to think more conservatively about the your trial narrative. The big point, think carefully before incorporating American symbols in your trial presentation.

For more information about this research here is the link;

http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/obsonline/sneaky-stars-and-stripes.html

Monday, March 28, 2011

Social rejection shares somatosensory representations with physical pain

Social rejection shares somatosensory representations with physical pain

Ethan Krossa,1, Marc G. Bermana, Walter Mischelb, Edward E. Smithb,c,1, and Tor D. Wagerd

Department of Psychology, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109; bDepartment of Psychology, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027; cNew York State Psychiatric Institute, New York, NY 10032; Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0345


Contributed by Edward E. Smith, February 22, 2011 (sent for review October 05, 2010)


How similar are the experiences of social rejection and physical pain? Extant research suggests that a network of brain regions that support the affective but not the sensory components of physical pain underlie both experiences. Here we demonstrate that when rejection is powerfully elicited—by having people who recently experienced an unwanted break-up view a photograph of their ex-partner as they think about being rejected—areas that support the sensory components of physical pain (secondary somatosensory cortex; dorsal posterior insula) become active. We demon- strate the overlap between social rejection and physical pain in these areas by comparing both conditions in the same individuals using functional MRI. We further demonstrate the specificity of the secondary somatosensory cortex and dorsal posterior insula activity to physical pain by comparing activated locations in our study with a database of over 500 published studies. Activation in these regions was highly diagnostic of physical pain, with positive predictive values up to 88%. These results give new meaning to the idea that rejection “hurts.” They demonstrate that re- jection and physical pain are similar not only in that they are both distressing—they share a common somatosensory representation as well.


http://www.pnas.org/content/early/2011/03/22/1102693108.full.pdf


This research is helpful in demonstrating to the jury, neuro-scientifically, the similarities between emotional and physical pain. There are no pain pills for emotional pain, however. Emotional loss physically hurts. These finding support the interesting research on embodied cognition.


Monday, March 7, 2011

Pressure and Perverse Flights to Familiarity

  1. Ab Litt,
  2. Taly Reich,
  3. Senia Maymin and
  4. Baba Shiv

+Author Affiliations

  1. Stanford University
  1. Ab Litt, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business, 518 Memorial Way, Stanford, CA 94305 E-mail: litt_ab@gsb.stanford.edu

Abstract

Under pressure, people often prefer what is familiar, which can seem safer than the unfamiliar. We show that such favoring of familiarity can lead to choices precisely contrary to the source of felt pressure, thus exacerbating, rather than mitigating, its negative consequences. In Experiment 1, time pressure increased participants’ frequency of choosing to complete a longer but incidentally familiar task option (as opposed to a shorter but unfamiliar alternative), resulting in increased felt stress during task completion. In Experiment 2, pressure to reach a performance benchmark in a chosen puzzle increased participants’ frequency of choosing an incidentally familiar puzzle that both augured and delivered objectively worse performance (i.e., fewer points obtained). Participants favored this familiar puzzle even though familiarity was established through unpleasant prior experience. This “devil you know” preference under pressure contrasted with disfavoring of the negatively familiar option in a pressure-free situation. These results demonstrate that pressure-induced flights to familiarity can sometimes aggravate rather than ameliorate pressure, and can occur even when available evidence points to the suboptimality of familiar options.

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/early/2011/03/01/0956797611400095.abstract

This research demonstrates why it is important to know juror schemas before constructing the case narrative. Jurors feeling pressure at trial to process the evidence will favor the familiar explanation of the defendant's conduct that confirms their experience of the world. Building your case from the bottom up is the only sure way to tell a story that jurors will understand.

Judicial Decision Making

The Psychology of Trial Judging

  1. Neil Vidmar

+Author Affiliations

  1. Duke University School of Law and Department of Psychology, Duke University
  1. Neil Vidmar, Duke Law School, Durham NC 27708-0360. E-mail:vidmar@law.duke.edu

Abstract

Trial court judges play a crucial role in the administration of justice for both criminal and civil matters. Although psychologists have studied juries for many decades, they have paid relatively little attention to judges. Recent writings, however, suggest that there is increasing interest in the psychology of judicial decision making. In this article, I review several selected areas of judicial behavior in which decisions appear to be influenced by psychological dispositions, but I caution that a mature psychology of judging field will need to consider the influence of the bureaucratic court setting in which judges are embedded, judges’ legal training, and the constraints of legal precedent.

http://cdp.sagepub.com/content/20/1/58.abstract