Showing posts with label Trial Lawyers Using Real Science;. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Trial Lawyers Using Real Science;. Show all posts

Monday, March 19, 2012

Will jurors who suppress compassion be more closed minded about safety rule violations?


The Cost of Callousness


Regulating Compassion Influences the Moral Self-Concept
  1. C. Daryl Cameron and
  2. B. Keith Payne

  1. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
  1. C. Daryl Cameron, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Department of Psychology, Davie Hall, Campus Box 3270, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3270 E-mail:dcameron@live.unc.edu

Abstract

It has often been argued that compassion is fundamental to morality. Yet people often suppress compassion for self-interested reasons. We provide evidence that suppressing compassion is not cost free, as it creates dissonance between a person’s moral identity and his or her moral principles. We instructed separate groups of participants to regulate their compassion, regulate their feelings of distress, or freely experience emotions toward compassion-inducing images. Participants then reported how central morality was to their identities and how much they believed that moral rules should always be followed. Participants who regulated compassion—but not those who regulated distress or experienced emotions—showed a dissonance-based trade-off. If they reported higher levels of moral identity, they had a greater belief that moral rules could be broken. If they maintained their belief that moral rules should always be followed, they sacrificed their moral identity. Regulating compassion thus has a cost of its own: It forces trade-offs within a person’s moral self-concept.
Psychological Science March 2012 vol. 23 no. 3 225-229

Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not

Trustworthiness is a social norm, but trusting is not

Cristina Bicchieri cb36@sas.upenn.edu
University of Pennsylvania, USA
Erte Xiao
Carnegie Mellon University, USA
Ryan Muldoon
University of Western Ontario, Canada
Abstract

Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding the punishment of distrusting behavior in a trust game. Our results show that people do not behave as though trust is a norm. Our participants expected that most people would not punish untrusting investors, regardless of whether the potential trustee was a stranger or a friend. In contrast, our participants behaved as though being trustworthy is a norm. Most participants believed that most people would punish someone who failed to reciprocate a stranger’s or a friend’s trust. We conclude that, while we were able to reproduce previous results establishing that there is a norm of reciprocity, we found no evidence for a corresponding norm of trust, even among friends.

Politics, Philosophy & Economics January 31, 2011 1470594X10387260, first published on January 31, 2011 doi:10.1177/1470594X10387260

Tuesday, April 26, 2011

Priming

Priming Competence Diminishes the Link Between Cognitive Test Anxiety and Test Performance

Implications for the Interpretation of Test Scores

  1. Jonas W.B. Lang1 and
  2. Jessica Lang2

+Author Affiliations

  1. 1Department of Work and Social Psychology, Maastricht University
  2. 2Institute of Occupational Medicine, RWTH Aachen University
  1. Jonas W.B. Lang, Maastricht University, Department of Work and Social Psychology, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands E-mail:jonas.lang@maastrichtuniversity.nl

Abstract

Researchers disagree whether the correlation between cognitive test anxiety and test performance is causal or explainable by skill deficits, which lead to both cognitive test anxiety and lower test performance. Most causal theories of test anxiety assume that individual differences in cognitive test anxiety originate from differences in self-perceived competence. Accordingly, in the present research, we sought to temporarily heighten perceptions of competence using a priming intervention. Two studies with secondary- and vocational-school students (Ns = 219 and 232, respectively) contrasted this intervention with a no-priming control condition. Priming competence diminished the association between cognitive test anxiety and test performance by heightening the performance of cognitively test-anxious students and by lowering the performance of students with low levels of cognitive test anxiety. The findings suggest that cognitively test-anxious persons have greater abilities than they commonly show. Competency priming may offer a way to improve the situation of people with cognitive test anxiety.

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/21/6/811.abstract