Interesting Reseacrh

Low-Effort Thought Promotes Political Conservatism

1. Scott Eidelman eidelman@uark.edu
2. Christian S. Crandall
3. Jeffrey A. Goodman
4. John C. Blanchar

Abstract

The authors test the hypothesis that low-effort thought promotes political conservatism. In Study 1, alcohol intoxication was measured among bar patrons; as blood alcohol level increased, so did political conservatism (controlling for sex, education, and political identification). In Study 2, participants under cognitive load reported more conservative attitudes than their no-load counterparts. In Study 3, time pressure increased participants’ endorsement of conservative terms. In Study 4, participants considering political terms in a cursory manner endorsed conservative terms more than those asked to cogitate; an indicator of effortful thought (recognition memory) partially mediated the relationship between processing effort and conservatism. Together these data suggest that political conservatism may be a process consequence of low-effort thought; when effortful, deliberate thought is disengaged, endorsement of conservative ideology increases.

Pers Soc Psychol Bull. 2012 Mar 16. 


Apparently, we were right after all. People who do not like to engage in deep effortful thought are more likely to be politically conservative. This may give us some information for jury selection Interesting research. 

Abstract

Implicit Juror Bias

(Re)Forming the Jury: Detection and Disinfection of Implicit Juror Bias

Anna Roberts

NYU School of Law


Connecticut Law Review, Vol. 44, 2012
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 11-70
Abstract:
This Article investigates whether one of the most intractable problems in trial procedure can be ameliorated through the use of one of the most striking discoveries in social science. The intractable problem is selecting a fair jury. Current doctrine fails to address the fact that jurors harbor not only explicit, or conscious bias, but also implicit, or unconscious, bias. The discovery is the Implicit Association Test (“IAT”), an online test that aims to reveal implicit bias.

This Article conducts the first comparison of proposals that the IAT be used to address jury bias. They fall into two groups. The first group would use the IAT to “screen” potential jurors for implicit bias; the second group would use the IAT to educate jurors about implicit bias. These proposals merit deeper consideration. Implicit bias is pervasive, and affects crucial juror functions: evaluation of evidence, recall of facts, and judgments of guilt. Juries are generally told nothing about implicit bias. The judiciary has expressed concern about implicit juror bias, and sought help from the academy in addressing the problem.

I provide what the proposals lack: critique and context. I show that using the IAT to screen jurors is misguided. The educational project has merit, however, since implicit bias can be countered through knowledge of its existence and motivation to address it. To refine the project, I identify two vital issues that distinguish the proposals: when jurors should learn about implicit bias, and how they should learn.

On the issue of when, I argue that the education should begin while the jurors are still being oriented. Orientation is not only universal, but, as research into “priming” and “framing” has shown, a crucial period for the forming of first impressions. On the issue of how, I argue that those proposals that would include the jurors taking an IAT are superior to those that would simply instruct jurors on what the IAT shows. In an area fraught with denial, mere instruction would likely be dismissed as irrelevant. I use pedagogical theory to show that experiential learning about bias is more likely to be effective.

I bring when and how together, proposing a model that would include the use of the IAT as an experiential learning tool during orientation. It would harness the civic energy of jurors to an educational purpose, rather than letting it morph into boredom; by putting jurors in an active mindset, it would enhance their satisfaction with the process, and their ability to perform optimally. As for potential jurors who are never selected, their participation would honor the long-standing educational function of jury service.

Here is the link: Juror Bias

Priming during trial. What are the possiblities?

Don't you know that you want to trust me? Subliminal goal priming and persuasion

Jean-Baptiste Légal ⁎, Julien Chappé, Viviane Coiffard, Audrey Villard-Forest

University of Paris  Ouest Nanterre La Défense, France

We investigated the effect of goal priming on the processing of a persuasive message. Before reading a persuasive message about tap water consumption, participants were subliminally primed (or not) with the goal “to trust”. Subsequently, they completed a questionnaire about their perception of the message, the source of the message, and tap water consumption intentions. The results indicated that non-conscious activation of the goal “to trust” leads to a better evaluation of the message, increases behavioral intentions in accordance with the message, and positively influences the assessment of the source.

© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

J.-B. Légal et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 48 (2012) 358–360

Antonio Damasio, a real star on the study of the mind.

Interesting Priming Video --- Do we really know the reasons for our decisions?

Danny Kahneman on Rational Decision Making

Professor Daniel Kahneman on Rational Decision Making in Society from Weizmann Australia on Vimeo.

The Social Psychology of Judging

This article introduces Dr. Carol Dweck’s seminal and significant line of psychological research on the phenomenon of implicit theories and draws on this research as a lens through which we might better understand judicial decision-making. In particular, the article focuses on the implications of two types of implicit theories – whether people believe that phenomena are static and fixed versus dynamic and malleable. By introducing this research, this article aims to forward a research agenda designed to examine how social, contextual, and situational forces influence judicial behavior.

An entity theory reflects the mindset that phenomena are fixed and unlikely to change. An incremental theory reflects the mindset that phenomena are malleable and can be developed. Humans hold entity or incremental implicit theories about, for example, human nature, social institutions, and society. These theories, or “mindsets,” affect perception, judgment, and decision-making and strongly shape how people organize their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions in the world. When an entity theory is salient, people expect that phenomena are fixed, immutable and unchangeable. However, when an incremental theory is salient, humans believe that phenomena are malleable, changeable, and affected by contexts and situations. Whether one holds an entity theory versus an incremental theory is often driven by situations, contexts, and social influences.

Implicit theories affect how jurists find facts, draw inferences, and impose punishment. Research on implicit theories, moreover, can enrich our understanding of how jurists apply the common law, engage in statutory interpretation, and construe the Constitution, offering novel insight into a timeless legal debate: whether American law is static versus dynamic. The article sets forth a research agenda that will form a line of psychological experiments to examine these processes.

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1920455

How do we use choice at trial?

When is vivid evidence persuasive?

Figural Vividness and Persuasion: Capturing the “Elusive” Vividness Effect

Rosanna E. Guadagno
University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL, USA, rosanna@ua.edu

Kelton v. L. Rhoads
University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Brad J. Sagarin

Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL, USA

Abstract

Despite the widespread belief that the use of vividness in persuasive communications is effective, many laboratory studies have failed to find vividness effects. A possible explanation for this discrepancy is that many laboratory tests have not vivified solely the central thesis of the message but have vivified irrelevant portions of the message as well or instead. Two experiments examined the effect of vivifying the central (“figure”) or non-central (“ground”) features of a message on persuasion. In both experiments, the formerly “elusive vividness effect” of superior persuasion was found, but only in vivid-figure communications. A mediation analysis revealed the salutary role of supportive cognitive elaborations, rather than memory for the communication, in mediating the vividness effect. The findings caution against attempts to persuade by increasing overall message vividness because off-thesis vividness has the unintended and undercutting consequence of distracting recipients from the point of the communication.
Here is the link to the article:
http://psp.sagepub.com/content/37/5/626.abstract

This is an interesting article about how to use vividness in communicating a message. There has been much controversy about whether vividness makes a message more memorable or persuasive. See,Nisbett, R., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall; Taylor, S. E., & Thompson, S. C. (1982). Stalking the elusive “vividness” effect. Psychological Review, 89, 155-181.

These psychologists argue that vividness is effective when the vivid elements of the message focuses the recipients attention on the central message intending to be communicated. Otherwise, if the vividness induces the recipient to focus on irrelevant or non-central aspects of the message it may in fact dilute its persuasiveness or detract from its memorability.

In one study mock jurors were given two versions of the same case. One description was colorless and the other vivid. The colorless version read: “On his way out the door, Sanders staggered against a serving table, knocking a bowl to the floor.” The vivid version read: “On

his way out the door, Sanders staggered against a serving table, knocking a bowl of guacamole dip to the floor and splattering guacamole on the white shag carpet.” The latter description is obviously very vivid. Guacamole on white shag carpet evokes wonderful imagery. Nonetheless, the central issue is the actor's intoxication and the splattering of the guacamole does nothing to focus on that issue. In fact, the imagery may have drawn the jurors' attention away for the issue in the case - - - was the actor drunk before he left the party.

If the message is made vivid by focusing the jurors attention on irrelevant facts you may actually dilute the message by introducing unnecessary background noise. Before trying to "punch up" your case through vividness, ask yourself whether the imagery helps jurors focus on the critical aspects of the trial story.

Remember, the Trial Lawyer Maxim, communication comes with the guarantee of relevance. If you communicate something to jurors they unconsciously assume that it is important to their decision making. The same holds true with focusing attention. If you focus a juror's attention on something they will assume it is important to their task. A trial lawyer cannot, and should not, tell jurors "what to think", but you can tell jurors "what to think about" by using the availability bias to your advantage and focus attention on the important facts. Making your important facts vivid can assist you in that task.

Are Judges Prone to the Status Quo Bias?

Extraneous factors in judicial decisions
Shai Danzigera,1, Jonathan Levavb,1,2, and Liora Avnaim-Pessoa
+ Author Affiliations

aDepartment of Management, Ben Gurion University of the Negev, Beer Sheva 84105, Israel; and
bColumbia Business School, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027
Edited* by Daniel Kahneman, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, and approved February 25, 2011 (received for review December 8, 2010)

Abstract

Are judicial rulings based solely on laws and facts? Legal formalism holds that judges apply legal reasons to the facts of a case in a rational, mechanical, and deliberative manner. In contrast, legal realists argue that the rational application of legal reasons does not sufficiently explain the decisions of judges and that psychological, political, and social factors influence judicial rulings. We test the common caricature of realism that justice is “what the judge ate for breakfast” in sequential parole decisions made by experienced judges. We record the judges’ two daily food breaks, which result in segmenting the deliberations of the day into three distinct “decision sessions.” We find that the percentage of favorable rulings drops gradually from ≈65% to nearly zero within each decision session and returns abruptly to ≈65% after a break. Our findings suggest that judicial rulings can be swayed by extraneous variables that should have no bearing on legal decisions.
http://lsolum.typepad.com/files/danziger-levav-avnaim-pnas-2011.pdf

Thinking about political attitudes during jury selection

http://www.psychologicalscience.org/index.php/publications/observer/obsonline/cognitive-and-motivation-style-differences-underlying-political-orientation.html

The Psychology of Uncertainty

This week it will be one year since President Barack Obama signed the Affordable Care Act (ACA) into law. Despite all the controversy that preceded the bill’s passage, most health policy experts confidently predicted that the public would soon embrace the legislation.

To back up these predictions, they pointed out that Medicare was quite controversial when it was established in the 1960s, but rapidly grew in popularity. Much the same happened more recently with Medicare Part D, the law championed by President George W. Bush to extend Medicare coverage to medications.
Recent polls belie these predictions, however, as support for health care reform has hit an all-time low. Why has the ACA failed to capture public support? Our research provides a novel explanation, one that pundits have failed to recognize to date.

Obama’s health reform bill is unpopular not simply because it is complicated, nor simply because it costs government money at a time when people are in a mood to balance the budget. Instead, it is unpopular in large part because it no longer feels inevitable.

And the key to gaining widespread support for Obama’s signature piece of domestic legislation is not to help the public better understand the intricacies of the bill, but instead to convince the public that the bill is here to stay.
Uncertainty can play a large role in reducing support for legislative actions. Consider a study we conducted, in which we asked people to imagine their local government had recently passed a bill to lower the speed limit, legislation spurred on by new evidence that such a law would save lives. The people we surveyed embraced the new rule, feeling thankful that legislators were paying attention to public safety.

However, in assessing public attitudes toward this bill, we conducted an experiment in which we told some of the people we surveyed that the legislature was about to pass the law but hadn’t yet voted on it – that is, it wasn’t officially a law yet. These people, in contrast to the first group, felt strongly that such legislation would be heavy-handed and paternalistic.

The same bill, when passed into law, was viewed more favorably than when it was merely pending legislation.
What about health care reform then? It has passed into law. Shouldn’t it be gaining in popularity?
Not if people don’t believe the bill is the law of the land. When the Republican-led House voted to repeal the bill, Washington insiders recognized the action as a symbolic gesture with no legislative consequence.
But many Americans thought this vote had actual legal implications. In fact, recent polls show that a fifth of the American public currently believe the ACA has been repealed, and another fifth is unsure if the bill still stands as law. This misperceived state of affairs provides no reason for these Americans to embrace a law they believe no longer stands.

Recent court rulings have created even greater uncertainty about the legal standing of the ACA. While most rulings have focused solely on the constitutionality of the health insurance mandate, one judge went as far as to opine that the entire law should be voided. This has left even more people wondering where the bill stands: as current law, pending law or past law?

Behavioral science has shown us that most people find uncertainty to be a very difficult pill to swallow, especially when it surrounds a proposed change to their lives. Half-hearted attempts at change often produce knee-jerk, negative reactions; people are not inclined to adapt to a change that may never occur or seems unlikely to stick. These are the types of situations most likely to breed backlash.


But when the uncertainty is removed, backlash reactions tend to dissipate and sometimes even reverse. When people know what cards they have been dealt – when they feel confident about what to expect in the future – people tend to begin the process of rationalizing the change and adapting to it.

The real battle over health care reform in the next few months will extend beyond the specifics of budget debates and regulatory wranglings. Instead the fate of health care reforms stands mainly on how soon, if ever, the public comes to feel that the legislation is enduring. If the permanence of the Affordable Care Act continues to feel unsettled, that will become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
http://www.detnews.com/article/20110324/AUTO01/103240350/UAW-to-launch-effort-to-boost-ranks